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Post-war state-building is fraught with challenges as “war-makers” pivot to become “state-makers.”
Citizen assessments of public good provision and physical security provide a measure of how state-
building is perceived internally. State-building may also necessitate external dependence (Russia, for
example, provides signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and military assistance to the post-Soviet de facto states), yet new
state authorities want to be seen as more than puppets. We study the relationship between internal and
external state-building dynamics in fostering citizen conﬁdence in the post-war state. We use original
population surveys to analyze public opinion and geographically disaggregated data on local violence
from four post-Soviet de facto statesdAbkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Trans-
dniestriadborn of war. We examine the scalar relationshipsdfrom the individual embedded in the local
context, to the regional (de facto territory) and supra-national (patron state and legitimacy in the in-
ternational community)dthat characterize them. We ﬁnd that distrust of the patron state reduces trust
in the de facto state president and translates into a lack of conﬁdence in the prevailing order. As fears of
conﬂict recurrence increase and disappointments about the economy worsen, these relationships are
maintained across the pathways deﬁned by the scale of patron trust-distrust.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction and argument
For armed groups in intrastate conﬂicts, winning thewar against
the state is just the beginning.1 A foundational challenge is for
former “war-makers” to demonstrate to their own citizens that
they now canmake good on their (implicit or explicit) commitment
to be “state-makers.” They have to convince their citizens that they
are credible rulers, “not only able to kill and to destroy but to build
and invest as well” (Schlichte, 2009, p. 96). In the absence of so
doing, the post-war era is likely to be plagued by distrust and,
possibly, cycles of violence, as no one can afford to let their guard
down. The question, then, is, what explains why citizens do (or doe), andrew.linke@geog.utah.
toalg@vt.edu (G. Toal).
result in military victory (e.g.
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partial victor, controlling the
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10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.011not) have conﬁdence in the post-war state's authorities and pre-
vailing order?
Coming out of a civil war, a central task on the road to make
credible their commitment to rule is for the new authorities to be
good state-builders (Flores & Nooruddin, 2011). Indeed, citizens'
conﬁdence in post-war states likely hinges on their assessment of
the provision of public goods such as welfare and, importantly,
security in their local area. State-building is rarely, however, an
exclusively internal endeavor. In the de facto states in the former
Soviet Union, for example, Russia has played a central role as
external patron. Russia provides signiﬁcant ﬁnancial and military
assistance to Abkhazia, Transdniestria, and South Ossetiadand,
through support of Armeniadindirectly to Nagorno-Karabakh. Yet
for the authorities of post-war states, reliance on such external
subventions and security measures complicates their claim to be
credible rulers in their own right, as it creates a relationship of
dependence. In particular, we argue that if citizens distrust the
external patron, the domestic authorities' efforts to foster citizen
conﬁdence in their rule might be jeopardized. Conversely, if the
domestic population trusts the patron state, the domesticunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
ilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
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benevolent helper.
To understand the dynamic relationship between the internal
and external inﬂuences on people's conﬁdence in the post-war
order, we utilize local-level data on violence and original survey
data collected in 2010e2011 in the four post-Soviet de facto states
cited above. Local-level data on violence allows us to investigate the
importance of a context of post-war security (or lack thereof),
whereas survey data enables us to examine social processes at the
individual level. Given data collection challenges, there are few
studies systematically examining individual attitudes across
conﬂict-ridden states. One of our contributions to the emerging
body of work employing surveys in post-war states (e.g. Blattman,
2009; Cassar, Grosjean, & Whitt, 2013; Samii, 2013; Bakke,
O’Loughlin, Toal, & Ward, 2014; Blair, 2016; De Juan & Pierskalla,
2016) is a geographically comparative perspective. Our analysis is
territorially disaggregated and conceptually rooted in hierarchical
scales of analysis, ranging from the individual embedded in the
local context, to the regional (de facto territory), and the supra-
national (patron state).
We begin by deﬁning what we mean by de facto states and
explain the “credible commitment problem” their authorities face
vis-a-vis their residents. We develop our argument, which con-
siders both the internal and external aspects of state-building that
may shape people's conﬁdence in their rulers and prevailing order.
The subsequent section describes the research design and data
from the four post-Soviet de facto states, all born from violent
struggles: Abkhazia (claimed by Georgia), Nagorno-Karabakh
(claimed by Azerbaijan), South Ossetia (claimed by Georgia), and
Transdniestria (claimed by Moldova). We then discuss our empir-
ical ﬁndings and conclude.
1.1. De facto states born from violent struggles
In most separatist conﬂicts, in which non-state groups ﬁght for
independence or greater autonomy within a state's border, the
outcome entails no major change on the world political map.
Relatively few struggles result in new states, and the separatists are
more often either defeated or appeased with institutional solutions
short of independence. In some cases, conﬂict results in the birth of
so-called de facto states. A state is considered a de facto state if it
possesses internal sovereignty, in the sense that it has adminis-
trative control over most or all of the territory it claims, but lacks
international recognition as a state (external sovereignty) by the
existing community of states (cf. Caspersen & Stansﬁeld, 2010;
Pegg, 1999).
The post-Cold War era has seen a proliferation of de facto states,
most of them born from violent struggles with their parent states.
The collapse of Yugoslavia saw the emergence of Republika Srpska
Krajina (in Croatia) and Republika Srpska (in Bosnia-Herzegovina),
as well as Kosovo after war and NATO intervention in 1999. The
collapse of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of several
breakaway “statelets,” including Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh,
Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transdniestria. De facto states exist
elsewhere across the world, too (for example, Somaliland and Iraqi
Kurdistan), some also emerging during the Cold War (e.g. the
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Taiwan). At least 21 de2 Their list includes Abkhazia, Anjouan, Biafra, Bougainville, Chechnya, East
Timor, Eritrea, Gagauzia, Katanga, Kosovo, Kurdistan-Iraq, Montenegro, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Northern Cyprus, Republika Srpska, Republika Srpska Krajina, Somali-
land, South Ossetia, Taiwan, Tamil Eelam, and Transdniestria. Note that de facto
states are not only a post-World War II phenomena; see, for example, Lemke (2008)
on “autonomous political entities” in the Rio de le Plata region of South America in
the 19th century.
Please cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
Political Geography (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.011facto states have emerged since World War II (Caspersen &
Stansﬁeld, 2010, p. 4).2 More than half have either been recap-
tured by their parent state (Chechnya, for example) or, in a few
cases, eventually recognized as states (Eritrea and East Timor have
received full international recognition, whereas Kosovo is now
recognized by some 111 out of 193 UN member states). Many de
facto states endure despite their lack of international recognition.
All the post-Soviet de facto states were the result of violent
separatist (or irredentist) struggles, each part of a dynamic of
nationalist mobilization and counter-mobilization with their so-
called parent state in the late 1980s-early 1990s. In Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, the “titular” population after which the regions were
named (not necessarily the majority of the population) sought
autonomy and subsequently independence from Georgia; in
Nagorno-Karabakh, the Armenian majority sought to exit
Azerbaijan and join Armenia; in Transdniestria, a multiethnic coa-
lition of Sovietized managers and workers mobilized against a pro-
Romanian nationalist wave in Moldova. Table 1 provides an over-
view of the still-existing (as of 2017) post-Soviet de facto states-
dand, as of writing, we are witnessing a process of de facto state
formation in eastern Ukraine.
1.2. Making credible promises to inhabitants of post-war states
One factor that may shape the relative endurance of de facto
statesdand shape stability in post-war states in generaldis
whether their inhabitants have faith in their authorities and pre-
vailing order. By winning the war, the separatists have made a
commitment, either implicit or explicit, to rule, and they now need
to make that commitment credible.
A problem facingmanywar-torn and post-war states is precisely
a credible commitment problem: the absence of an authority
whom residents trust to protect their security (e.g. Posen, 1993;
Walter, 2002). This absence of a credible central authority fosters
distrust and makes way for spirals of insecurity and violence as
groups within the state (think they) have to fend for themsel-
vesdparticularly if accompanied by fear-ladenmyths of a zero-sum
struggle (Brubaker, 2004; Kaufman, 2001). This security dilemma
logic, ﬁrst developed to explain behavior among states in the in-
ternational system (Jervis, 1978), helps explain the dynamics be-
tween (former) warring groups in multi-ethnic states, in which the
minority distrusts that the majority will have their interests at
heart (Fearon, 1998). Yet the credible commitment problem is not
just about fostering trust among former warring parties that the
other “side” will stick to a peace agreement. It is just as much about
fostering trust among the citizens that the post-war authorities will
make good on their (implicit or explicit) promise to rule and pro-
vide public goods (Coyne & Boettke, 2009; Flores & Nooruddin,
2011; Keefer, 2008). This aspect of the credible commitment
problem exists also after wars that end through military victories
(and expulsion of the war-time enemy).
Although making credible their commitment to rule is a chal-
lenge for any post-war state government, it may be particularly
pertinent in de facto states forged by violent territorial struggles.
Given their lack of recognition as states, they have a double burden
of earning their own inhabitants’ trust (demonstrating that they are
up to the task), a challenge they share with any post-war state, as
well as convincing the international community that they deserve
to be states (Berg &M€older, 2012; Caspersen, 2008; 2010). Indeed,
even dysfunctional recognized states, such as Somalia, while often
recipients of international criticism, do not have to convince the
international community that they deserve to be states (cf. Krasner,
2009; Coggins, 2014).
Thus, an important theoretical (and policy) outcome in post-war
states, including de facto states, is the perceived credibility of theilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
Table 1
Still existing post-Soviet de facto states born of war.
Main separatist group(s) Parent state Violent conﬂict begins Ceaseﬁre/birth of de facto state De facto state
Armenians/
Karabakhis
USSR/
Azerbaijan
1988 1994 Nagorno-Karabakh
Dniester Slavs Moldova 1990 1992 Transdniestria
Ossetians Georgia 1991 1992 South Ossetia
Abkhaz Georgia 1992 1993 Abkhazia
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related ways. First, we want to know if citizens trust the executive
power in the state. The very starting point in the security dilemma
is the lack of trust in the ruler, the central authoritydand there is by
now a growing body of work emphasizing the importance of (and
examining) political trust in post-war states (e.g. De Juan &
Pierskalla, 2016; Wong, 2016). Second, we want to capture a
broader sense of conﬁdence in the prevailing order. We draw on the
conceptualization of political legitimacy as citizens' “actual quality
consent” to rule. The philosopher Amanda Greene (2016) argues
that the more widespread citizens' quality consent, the more
legitimate the rule. Consistent with our state-building argument,
she believes that actual quality consent is shaped by citizens’
assessment of governance. The expression of quality consent, she
argues, can be rather general, such as people afﬁrming that things
are going well. In the context of a post-war society, political legit-
imacy based on such a sense of conﬁdence in the prevailing order is,
like political trust, central for individuals overcoming the negative
spiral of the security dilemma.
1.3. Internal and external inﬂuences on people's conﬁdence in their
rulers
There are a number of reasons to believe (and evidence to
support) the contention that conﬁdence in a (de facto) state's ruler
and prevailing order is inﬂuenced by how successful the state is at
providing its citizens with public goods (Bakke et al., 2014; Espinal,
Hartlyn, & Kelly, 2006; Flores & Nooruddin, 2016; Gilley, 2006;
King, 2001; Norris, 1999; OECD, 2010). We draw on the insights
of scholars who suggest that legitimate authority rests with an
implicit (and often mythologized) social contract between ruler
and ruled (Moore, 1978; Scott, 1972). The ruler provides beneﬁts,
most importantly social order, to the ruled, and the ruled, in turn,
accept the ruler's right to rule. Given the importance of security in
the social contract between ruler and ruled (Lake, 2010; Wickham-
Crowley, 1987), an ability to ensure “national security” both from
external enemies and domestic instability is central to the credi-
bility of both recognized and de facto states (Berg &M€older, 2012).
As far as security goes, in all the post-Soviet de facto states, the
wars concluded without formal settlements. Separatist forces, with
variable and debated levels of Russian support, gained the upper
hand in the armed struggle, leading to ceaseﬁres. Whereas Trans-
dniestria's post-war record has been relatively free from political
violence, it is a polity dominated by well-connected oligarchic
networks (Bobick, 2011). Nagorno-Karabakh has been the scene of
some elite-level struggles among former allies (DeWaal, 2004), and
there have been numerous clashes and sniper attacks on the
boundary line with Azerbaijan. April 2016 saw a return to large-
scale armed struggle, resulting in casualty levels not seen since
the ceaseﬁre brokered in 1994. Indeed, in 2011 and 2013, our
ﬁeldwork in Nagorno-Karabakh's “border” regions revealed both
long-standing and new tank emplacements and trenchesdsigns
that the worry of war recurrence is a daily reality. Both Abkhazia
and South Ossetia saw serious but brief outbreaks of ﬁghting before
the August War of 2008 (e.g. Welt, 2009). In August 2008, low-Please cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
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tary assault on South Ossetia, which triggered a short but deadly
interstate conﬂict as Russian forces invaded to save their South
Ossetian allies (Toal, 2017). Abkhaz forces, with the help of Russian
air power, used the opportunity to establish control over the upper
Kodor(i) Valley, which a Georgian warlord controlled until ousted
by the Georgian government in 2006 (Marten, 2012). Both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have also seen internal political
struggles that have occasionally spilled into violence, as well as
criminal violence (ICG 2007; 2010b).
Such violent incidents are likely to foster concerns about secu-
rity, which, along with concerns about public goods provisionmore
generally, raise the question of whether de facto states can do what
states are “supposed to do.” Indeed, central to understanding the
local population's perceptions of de facto states (and post-war
states more generally) is that the threat of violence is part of peo-
ple's consciousness (Linke & O’Loughlin, 2015). Some locales are
more dangerous and conﬂictual than others (for example, because
they are close to ceaseﬁre lines or because of perceived hostility, as
in the Gal(i) region of Abkhazia). If violence perpetrated by mil-
itants and military/police responses occur with perennial consis-
tency in a region, residents in that locality are more likely to lack
conﬁdence in the central authority and prevailing order thanwhere
such events do not occur with regularity. Though there are nuances
to this general expectation (we explore them below), the principle
is straightforward. Reading about a violent attack distant from your
home, workplace, and immediate social circle is different than
personally fearing a deadly explosion in your daily activity space or
hearing by word of mouth that a neighbor has been killed. We
would expect events that are tangible to be more likely to affect
attitudes than remotely occurring conﬂicts.
Yet state-building is rarely, if ever, a result of purely domestic
dynamics. Post-war states need the help of external actors in ful-
ﬁlling public goods provisiondbe that economic aid, democrati-
zation assistance, or even direct help in ruling and providing
security (Brzoska, 2006; Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Krasner & Risse,
2014). Indeed, one way to overcome the security dilemma created
by the absence of a credible central authority is for outside actors to
serve as security guarantors (Fearon,1998;Walter, 2002) or provide
foreign aid (Flores & Nooruddin, 2011). In de facto states, non-
recognition may increase the likelihood of external dependence
on select or singular foreign patrons (King, 2001; Kolstø &
Blakkisrud, 2008). As Nina Caspersen (2010, 82) notes, de facto
states’ “lack of recognition and precarious position make them
highly unattractive to foreign investors and they are, in most cases,
also blocked from receiving international assistance and loans. As a
consequence, most of these entities have to rely almost entirely on
a patron state.”
Once external actors become involved in state-building proc-
essesdbe it through economic aid, military intervention, security
assistance, or as security guarantorsdquestions of legitimacy, de-
pendency, and local ownership arise (cf. Caspersen, 2015; Paris &
Sisk, 2007), as do questions about the credibility of the third
party (Walter, 2002). Drawing on these insights, we posit that, to
the degree that the external actor who backs the domesticilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
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ered untrustworthy, the authorities' credibility will suffer.
Conversely, if the domestic population thinks highly of their patron
state's leadership, the domestic authorities' credibility will be
boosted. Directly, this may go simply by way of association, based
on a guilt-by-association mechanism (cf. Johnson, 2011). In
particular, if an external actor exerts signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
domestic authoritiesdin the form of, for example, providing critical
military or economic supportdpeople's perception of the domestic
authorities is unlikely to be independent of their view of the
external actor exerting that inﬂuence. Indirectly, it is difﬁcult for
external actors to provide effective and efﬁcient public good
assistance if they are considered untrustworthy (Krasner & Risse,
2014; Suhrke, 2007), and, as a result, their involvement can tar-
nish the credibility of the local authorities. That is, while third
parties are sometimes viewed as critical for successful conﬂict
resolution and post-war stability and development, they can also
serve the opposite role, undermining the credibility of the (de facto)
state leadership in the eyes of large segments of their populations.
Indeed, stated commitments to peace might be even less likely to
be trusted with an untrustworthy powerful patron looming over
the post-war society.
In Abkhazia, neither the entity's state-building efforts nor peo-
ple's perceptions of the de facto state can be seen in isolation from
substantial ﬁnancial and military back-up from Russia (ICG 2010a;
Kolossov & O’Loughlin, 2011). For years, the authorities have been
calibrating a ﬁne balance between being grateful for Russian sup-
port, yet wanting to avoid being seen as entirely dependent on their
powerful neighbor or subject to its dictates. In the words of the
deputy foreign minister:
There is no direct attempt of the Russian Federation to inﬂuence
our decisions; there is no dictating from Russia. I can't imagine
that happening. (…) Of course, the Russian presence here is felt.
Abkhazia needs huge assistance: money and expertise. The only
country offering that is Russia … 3
Indeed, since Russia's recognition of Abkhazia in August 2008, in
the wake of the Georgia-Russia war, a central debate in Abkhaz
politics concerns the extent, depth and nature of Russian inﬂuence
in the polity (Gerrits & Bader, 2016).
South Ossetia and Transdniestria are also recipients of Moscow's
aid, and Armenia serves as Nagorno-Karabkah's patron (Kolstø,
2006). The former minister of industry in Transdniestria charac-
terized Russia's support as “symbolic aid.” This, he explained, took
the form of favorable gas prices and support to the republic's
budget for pensions and education. The “symbolic aid,” he esti-
mated, makes up about 20 percent of the republic's budget.4 About
Nagorno-Karabakh, Thomas De Waal (2004, 246) observes: “On an
everyday level, Karabakh had become a province of Armenia. Kar-
abakh Armenians were entitled to carry Armenian passports. Its
currency was the Armenian dram. The budget was supported by
free credits from the Armenian Finance Ministry” (for further ex-
amples, see O’Loughlin, Kolossov, & Toal, 2014).
Given this dependence on the external patron state, we are
particularly interested in examining whether de facto state in-
habitants perceive the leadership of the external patron to be
trustworthy, expecting that high distrust of an external patron will
have negative impact on people's conﬁdence in the de facto state's3 Personal communication, Sukhum/Sokhumi, Sept. 11, 2013.
4 Personal communication, Tiraspol, Sept. 14, 2012. Other sources indicate that, at
the time of our survey, the ﬁgure is likely much higher (e.g. Chamberlain-Creanga &
Allin, 2010).
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as a security guarantor in these entities and backs them up ﬁnan-
cially, we also expect that theremay be a conditional relationship at
work. People's perceptions of the danger of renewed warfare and
experiences of violence will have a particularly damaging effect on
the credibility of the de facto state if they do not trust the patron's
leadership. Similarly, because the patron is a source of ﬁnancial
support, people's concerns about unemployment or lack of eco-
nomic development will have a particularly damaging effect on
local credibility if they do not trust the patron's leadership.
Conversely, if people are very worried about their physical and
material security, trust in the patron state's leadership might
mitigate these worries. These conditional relationships, presented
in Table 2, are at the heart of our analysis.
In sum, in assessing whether individuals have conﬁdence in the
de facto state authorites and prevailing order, we expect to see
differences among individuals related to their experiences of
violence locally, as well as the their personal perceptions of both
governance within their de facto state and the patron state.
We indicate a note of caution on causation: We argue that there
is a causal relationship between people's views on state-building,
conditional on their trust in the patron state's leadership, and
conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order. There is a longstanding
tradition of research on the determinants of political trust that
relies on attitudinal variables (e.g. Mishler & Rose, 2001), and the
state-building part of our argument is consistent with this body of
research in post-war settings (e.g. Askvik, Jamil, & Dhakal, 2011;
Bakke et al., 2014). That said, there are limitations to causal infer-
ence when using cross-sectional attitudinal variables. We try to
overcome some of these concerns by using also non-perceptional
measures of violence that capture people's experiences of
violence prior to the conduct of the surveys. Yet one objection to
our argument is that it might well be that people's trust in their
own authorities shapes their trust in the patron state and not, as we
argue, vice versa, via a similar association mechanism. There is,
however, a strong theoretical reason why causality goes in the di-
rection we propose. Both in developing countries and post-war
societies, and certainly in post-war de facto states (Caspersen,
2010; King, 2001; Kolstø & Blakkisrud, 2008), external support to
state-building often elicits intense debate about local ownership
and local legitimacy because there is a relationship of dependence,
in which the patron is the more powerful party. The recipient state
needs the patron's support to rule (but not vice versa), and the
population in the recipient state is well aware that is the case. As
such, it is of greater consequence for the recipient state authorities'
credibility than for the patron state authorities' credibility whether
the recipient state's population trusts them.
2. Research design
2.1. Survey data
The public opinion surveys that allow us to explore state-
building dynamics in Abkhazia (N ¼ 1000), Nagorno-Karabakh
(N ¼ 800), South Ossetia (N ¼ 460), and Transdniestria (N ¼ 976)
were designed by O'Loughlin et al. (2014). In each research site,
shown in Map 1, the surveys were carried out by reputable private
ﬁrms or organizations, employing local interviewers. Preliminary
visits by the investigators and meetings with the presidential ad-
ministrations and other local agencies ensured no interferencewith
the surveys. For information about the conduct of the surveys and
speciﬁcs of each locality, see O’Loughlin, Kolossov, & Toal (2011;
2013) and Toal & O'Loughlin (2013a; 2013b).
A number of steps were taken to ensure that we can engage in
meaningful analyses across the four cases: the random selection ofilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
Map 1. The de facto states survey locations in their regional context. Rayoni borders and sampling point towns/cities are shownwhere they are used for aggregating violent events.
Table 2
Conditional expectations for the relationship proposed between trustworthiness of the external patron's leadership, common state-building concerns among de facto state
residents (physical and material security), and conﬁdence in local rulers and prevailing order.
Trust in patron state leadership Distrust of patron state leadership
High worries about new war or lack of economic
development
Medium conﬁdence in de facto state's ruler and prevailing order
(patron trust can mitigate negative effects of high worries)
Low conﬁdence in de facto state's ruler and
prevailing order
Low worries about new war or lack of economic
development
High conﬁdence in de facto state's ruler and
prevailing order
Medium conﬁdence in de facto state's ruler
and prevailing order
(patron distrust may jeopardize positive
effect of low worries)
5 For this question, we recode all “difﬁcult to say” answers to “no,” as the answer
indicates doubt about trusting the authority in question.
K.M. Bakke et al. / Political Geography xxx (2017) 1e15 5sampling points; the proportional distribution across the various
local nationalities; the wide-ranging and lengthy number and na-
ture of the questions (about 75 percent of the questions on any
survey overlap with those in the three other sites); the use of local
languages and trusted interviewers (including in Gal(i) in Abkahzia,
the use of local Georgian/Mingrelian teachers as intermediaries and
interview assistants); and the close timing of the surveys (March
2010 in Abkhazia, June 2010 in Transdniestria, October 2010 in
South Ossetia, and November 2011 in Nagorno-Karabakh). We have
elsewhere highlighted the special political and post-war conditions
operating in the individual republics, which we here account for by
analyzing the cases both individually and comparatively. This
article focuses on the comparable struggle of leaders to gain their
citizens' conﬁdence in an international environment in which their
entities’ status as separate political units is challenged and dis-
missed as artiﬁcial by their parent states.
One problemwe encountered in the Abkhazia survey, is that for
many questions, the Georgian respondents opt for the “don't know”
option (see Bakke et al., 2014). Given the Georgian population's
precarious situation in Abkhazia (e.g. Human Rights Watch, 2011),
this strategy is likely a way out of responding to politically sensitive
and difﬁcult questions. To avoid that these respondents are sys-
tematically excluded from the analysis by treating them as missing
observations, we use copula methods to impute the answers
(Nelson, 2010; for further description, see Bakke et al., 2014). This
tendency of avoiding sensitive questions is unlikely to be driving
“don't know” responses in the other surveys. In Nagorno-Karabakh,
all the survey respondents are Armenian, reﬂecting the ethnic
make-up of the entity. In South Ossetia, the survey data analyzedPlease cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
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the post-war state-building project has been built around creating
a multi-ethnic entity (Kolstø & Malgin, 1998), hence there is less
reason to expect personal insecurity to be driving “don't know”
answers among the responses of any ethnic group in particular.
Relations between the ethnic groups there are signiﬁcantly better
than elsewhere, and the state constitution and government
agencies guarantee equal rights to all groups, though in practice,
ethnic Moldovans suffer discrimination in education, and in cul-
tural and political entitlements.
2.2. Operationalization and description of variables
2.2.1. Dependent variables
The theoretical outcome of interest in this study is the credi-
bility of the ruler among post-war states' own citizensdin our case,
de facto states' inhabitants. As noted above, we think of credibility
in two ways. First, given that doubts about the central authority is
the theoretical starting point of the commitment problem that
often characterize conﬂict-ridden or post-war states, we want to
know if people have conﬁdence in the executive power of the state.
As such, we rely on a survey question that asks the respondents
whether they trust the president (who is unnamed), based on a
dichotomous yes/no question.5 The surveys show a strong variation
from high trust in Nagorno-Karabakh (84 percent) and Abkhaziailding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
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Transdniestria (38 percent). Local contextual reasons for this vari-
ation are discussed in O'Loughlin et al. (2014). Second, as a broader
and alternative measure, but with the same expectations, we want
to capture credibility in the sense of conﬁdence in the prevailing
order. To do so, we analyze a question that asks our respondents
whether things in the de facto state are moving in the right or
wrong direction (a dichotomous question).6 In Nagorno-Karabakh,
62 percent indicate that things are “generally moving in the right
direction”; in Abkhazia, 67 percent; in South Ossetia, 70 percent;
and in Transdniestria, 28 percent. This is a common survey ques-
tion, also used in the Eurobarometer surveys, which indicates the
level of general (dis)satisfaction with the current state of affairs.2.2.2. Independent variables
Because, we argue, conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order
are inﬂuenced by howwell de facto governments perform the tasks
that states do, we rely on variables that capture assessments of the
provision of both material and security-related public goods. We
use a survey question that asks people about economic public
goods provision: “how big of a problem is lack of economic
development or unemployment.” As for external security, we
include a question that asks, “how big of a problem is the threat of
another war?”7 The responses range from 1 (“no problem at all”) to
2 (“not a big problem”), 3 (“a rather big problem”), and 4 (“a very
big problem”).
To assess perceptions of how trustworthy the external patron is,
we rely on a question that asks respondents whether they trust the
patron state's leadership (again, there was no individual name
prompt).8 We expect patron distrust to be negatively associated
with respondents' conﬁdence in the president and prevailing order.
In Nagorno-Karabakh, trust in the Armenian leadership among our
respondents is 82 percent, while in Transdniestria, trust in the
Russian leadership is at 70 percent. In South Ossetia, 87 percent of
respondents trust the Russian leadership. In Abkhazia, trust in the
Russian leadership is lower, at 74 percent, due to the lower trust
among the Georgian/Mingrelian respondents (but for the titular
ethnic group only, the ethnic Abkhaz, trust in the patron state is 87
percent).
To capture more than perceptions of safety and security, we
include a non-perceptional, or objective, measure for local-level
violence preceding the time of the surveys in each territory,
expecting that people who live in geographic areas that have
experienced violence in close proximity in the recent past are less
inclined to have conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order. As we
argue above, local violence is integral in shaping people's percep-
tions in post-war states, so in the second step of our analysis, we
interact this measure for violence with our key independent vari-
ables of interest (more below). By treating the context of violence
speciﬁcally in this manner, we move beyond viewing it as back-
ground noise or a context-level problem that should be controlled
for in the analysis (Agnew, 1987).
We conﬁgure the violence measurement using several
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) steps. Our violent events,
coded per the protocol of the Armed Conﬂict Location and Event
Data Project (Raleigh& Dowd, 2017), include the exact location and
timing of a violent incident, as well as other qualities of the event,6 We recode all “difﬁcult to say” answers to “moving in the wrong direction,” as
the answer indicates doubt about where the entity is going.
7 In Transdniestria, this question asks, “how much tension is there around the
current situation in Transdniestria?”
8 We recode all “difﬁcult to say” answers to “no,” as the answer indicates doubt
about trusting the authority in question.
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carried out bymilitary or non-military actors, andwhether violence
was directed against civilians or was a “battle” event between two
armed actors). Here, we examine all types of events. The geographic
coordinates of each event allow us to map them across the study
areas. For Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, we have the exact
sampling points used in the surveys (see Map 1); for the other two
cases, we use the centroids of the small rayoni (counties) that
constitute the primary sampling units. To aggregate the violence
data to survey respondent locations in a GIS platform that merges
both formats (survey and events), we measure the distance from
each respondent's location to the violent events in their de facto
state.9 We deﬁne the temporal dimension so that all violence is
included if it took place after the end of the de facto states'
respective major wars and before the date of survey enumeration.
One beneﬁt of our approach is that it does not rely exclusively on
political boundaries of any administrative units to deﬁne which
violent events affected survey respondents; violence proximate to a
survey respondent may have an effect on his or her views even
though the incident occurred just across a political boundary line.
In our analysis, we capture a violent history by considering the raw
count of all violent events within a 25 km threshold of each
respondent since the end of the war in her/his de facto state of
residence. We assume that it is the longer-term history of violence
that shapes people's conﬁdence in the post-war order, and a 25 km
threshold captures violence that can reasonably be assumed to be
experienced by each respondent. There is some difﬁculty identi-
fying distances that apply perfectly across different social settings,
but this is a reasonable compromise. In a place like Transdniestria,
100 km is so big that it has little meaning and would encompass
large parts of Moldova proper, but there are also conceptual lower
limits. At one kilometer, for example, violent incidents are so rare
that it would be almost meaningless for examining our expecta-
tions. In the appendix, we include a replication of our main ﬁndings
at a ﬁve kilometer threshold, and the ﬁndings are consistent with
what we ﬁnd at a 25 km threshold.
To capture the conditional relationships hypothesized to be at
workdhow trust in the patron state is likely to condition the effects
of people's concerns about 1) new war and 2) lack of economic
developmentdwe introduce two interaction terms.We present the
impact of the interactive hypotheses on conﬂict graphically, as
predicted values with accompanying conﬁdence intervals
(Braumoeller, 2004; Clark, Gilligan, & Golder, 2006; Franzese, Kam,
& Jamal, 2001). For tables that contain the full set of variable esti-
mates, see the online appendix. We ﬁrst introduce the two-way
interaction terms. Then, consistent with our argument about
carefully examining individuals' context of violence, we introduce
ﬁgures that show how different degrees of background violence
shape these relationships.2.2.3. Control variables
We control for a range of alternative explanations. To assess
people's level of dependence on economic public goods provision,
we include a survey question that asks the respondents to rate their
family's material situation. As for violence, although our expecta-
tion is that individuals' perceptions of post-war violence will shape
their conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order, we control for9 In South Ossetia and Transdniestria, due to data limitations, we use the center
point of the international administrative unit boundaries to aggregate events in the
same fashion. Using the center point allows for threshold deﬁnitions based on
distance instead of boundaries, and variation across these can be compared to the
other two de facto states, where using administrative unit borders would not allow
such a reference.
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during the war may be more fearful about its aftermath and
possible recurrence and have a harder time believing in and
trusting anyone, including those in power. To assess this possibility,
we use a question that asks whether the respondents or their close
relatives witnessed violence resulting in injury or death during the
war.
Our main theoretical focus is on the state-building endeavors
likely to be inﬂuenced by the patron states (economic development
and prospects for war recurrence), though it may be that people's
concerns about state-building go beyond economic and physical
safety. People's worries about democratic development, as well as
concerns for crime and corruption are likely to shape conﬁdence in
the rulers and prevailing order (Anderson & Guillory, 1997;
Caspersen, 2008; Mishler & Rose, 2001; Seligson, 2002). Our
analysis sample is reduced for every additional variable that we
include (due to dropping “don't know” responses). Therefore, we
include analyses that control for these additional state-building
concerns (concerns about crime and corruption, as well as per-
ceptions of level of democracy) in the appendix.
Whereas our argument focuses on material aspects of state-
building, we take into account that people's identities may shape
their conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order. Indeed, both
states and de facto states often aim to foster a collective identity. In
some post-war and de facto states, authorities have highlighted the
population's shared war experiences and common enemy to create
collective solidarity (Blakkisrud & Kolstø, 2011; Kolstø, 2006;
Lynch, 2004; OECD, 2010). To examine whether such solidarity is
associated with conﬁdence in the authorities and prevailing order,
we rely on a survey question that asks people how they “think now”
of the war-time out-group (in the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, the Georgians; in the case of Transdniestria, the Moldo-
vans; and in the case of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azerbaijanis). If
people feel negatively about the wartime out-group, they may be
more likely to have conﬁdence in the post-war order based on a
clear common enemy image.
Due to the ethnocratic nature of the state-building efforts in
most de facto states, we control for whether the respondents are a
minority group in the de facto entity, i.e. not a member of the
“titular” or dominant ethnic group. In the case of Nagorno-
Karabakh and South Ossetia, this is not an issue, as all the re-
spondents are of the titular group, but in Abkhazia and Trans-
dniestria, members of the minority communities may have a
different position in society than the titular groups. Thus, in
Abkhazia, we consider whether respondents are non-members of
the titular Abkhaz group, and in Transdniestria, we consider
whether respondents are non-Russian. We do not interpret this
variable in substantial terms; it is understood to be a control in the
usual sense. Our main model also includes site ﬁxed effects for each
de facto state, as there is reason to believe that unobserved differ-
ences between the regions exist (including speciﬁc conditions at
the time of the survey). We also show the results from running the
models separately on the sample from each de facto state, which
allows us to see if the main trends we observe are “carried” by any
of the four entities.
We further control for general trust, gender, and year of birth. To
the degree that political trust is associated with a predisposition to
be trusting of people in general (cf. Eckstein, Fleron, Hoffman, &
Reisinger, 1998), we include a question that asks respondents, “In
general, would you say that most people can be trusted or you have
to careful.” Experience of serving in the military is likely to shape
male versus female responses, as can gender-based roles in these
traditional societies. We anticipate that younger respondents, who
have come of age and been socialized since the entities gained their
de facto status around 1992, are more likely to have conﬁdence inPlease cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
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socialized in the Soviet context.
3. Empirical ﬁndings
We present our ﬁndings in ﬁgures that show predicted proba-
bilities for the perceived credibility of the ruler and prevailing or-
der, as assessed by trust in the president and conﬁdence about the
trajectory of the current state of affairs. Our discussion focuses on
the conditional relationships between the internal and external
aspects of state-building, but the full regression outputs (and
robustness checks) are in the appendix. We have estimated the
coefﬁcients by using a generalized linear model (GLM) of binary
outcomes with an interaction term for moderating variables and
ﬁxed effects for the four main de facto regions. Interaction terms in
regression results are most effectively interpreted graphically,
because varying effects can be observed across the range of com-
bined independent variables' values. In line with standard practice,
we present predicted probabilities of observing the outcome across
the range of constitutive terms (cf. Braumoeller, 2004; Clark et al.,
2006; Franzese et al., 2001). First, in Figs. 1e3, we show how an
external variable (patron distrust) modiﬁes the link between in-
ternal variables (concerns about state-building) and conﬁdence in
the ruler and prevailing order. We ﬁrst show the cross-case ﬁnd-
ings, then the ﬁndings for each de facto state. Second, we introduce
ﬁgures demonstrating that key to understanding these dynamics is
consideration for the geographical context of violence surrounding
the people living in the region (how severe conﬂict has been at the
local level). When interpreting our ﬁgures, note that the perceptual
variables are coded so that a higher score (from 1 to 4) indicates
that the respondent ﬁnds the question under consideration to be a
“bigger problem.” The variable capturing “patron distrust” is
dichotomous, with 1 indicating distrust in the patron's leadership
and 0 indicating that he or she trusts the patron.
Fig. 1 shows how respondents’ worries about the prospects of a
new war with their parent state (Fig. 1A) and worries about eco-
nomic development (Fig. 1B) shape their conﬁdence in the pre-
vailing order, conditional on whether they trust (solid line) or
distrust (dotted line) the patron state. The shaded areas indicate
conﬁdence intervals (95 percent). Fig. 2 shows how the same
concerns, about new war (Fig. 2A) and economic development
(Fig. 2B), shape respondents’ conﬁdence in the president, condi-
tional on trusting the patron state.
As we would expect, the declining slopes of the lines indicate
that growing worries among residents about the de facto state's
ability to provide for their security and material well-being is
associated with less conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order.
The ﬁgures also demonstrate that patron state distrust is associated
with lower conﬁdence both in the president and prevailing order,
compared with respondents who do trust the patron. Indeed,
particularly when it comes to trust in the president (Fig. 2), the gap
between the solid and dotted lines towards the right end of the x-
axis indicates that patron trust might actually mitigate the negative
impact of concerns about a new war or concerns about lack of
economic development. Trust in the leadership of that “benevo-
lent” patrondwhich serves as a security guarantor and provides
ﬁnancial assistancedhelps boost credibility of the local ruler. Figs.1
and 2 also underscore that increased concerns about key state-
building functionsdproviding for citizens' physical and material
securityddiminishes the positive effect that patron trust, on its
own, has on credibility of the ruler and prevailing order (note the
negative slope of the solid lines). The ﬁndings conﬁrm a complex
interplay of individuals' internal and external considerations in
these settings of social and institutional formation. Worries about
state-building diminish the credibility of the ruler and prevailingilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
Fig. 1. Conﬁdence in the prevailing order by patron (dis)trust and perceptions of state-building.
Fig. 2. Trust in the president by patron (dis)trust and perceptions of state-building.
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ruler is perceived as untrustworthy.
Next, we present the site-speciﬁc analyses, which suggest that
our ﬁndings may be driven by the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh
(Fig. 3A) and Abkhazia (Fig. 3B); overlapping conﬁdence intervals
makes it harder to distinguish between the patron effects in South
Ossetia (Fig. 3C) and Transdniestria (Fig. 3D). Such variations
among sites is not a surprise, and do not invalidate our general
conclusions. First, the differences between sites are captured in our10 As there is also a chance that the 2008 war in Georgia that involved Abkhazia
and South Ossetia affect the ﬁndings, we separately analyzed the effects of violent
events for all years and for the post-2008 period. The results were consistent for
both time periods.
Please cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
Political Geography (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.011site-level ﬁxed effects in the main models, which means that the
estimates for the general relationships are not sullied by the dif-
ferences. Second, we embrace the regional variation between de
facto states as a meaningful representation of different institutional
and historical conditions that can be the focus of future scholarly
investigations.10
Building on the assumption that a context of violence is integral
to people's perceptions in post-war states, we now add an addi-
tional variable to our main analysis, the comparative ﬁndings pre-
sented in Figs. 1 and 2. Our objective measure for violence at sub-
national scales represents a third layer of complexity beyond the
individual-level perceptions reported thus far, allowing us to
examine how contexts of insecurity shape our ﬁndings.
We present the ﬁndings from our three-way interaction terms
graphically. As in the previous ﬁgures, the solid and dotted lines are,ilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
Fig. 3. Main results for the individual de facto states.
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K.M. Bakke et al. / Political Geography xxx (2017) 1e15 11respectively, trust and distrust in the patron, and the y-axis shows
the probability of respondents trusting the president or having
conﬁdence in the prevailing order. In this extended analysis, we
have changed the horizontal axis, which now shows the distribu-
tion of violent events that took place within the respondents' lo-
cality (25 km) since the end ofmajor ﬁghting. To retain the dynamic
effect of how varying concerns about fears of renewed war with the
parent state and concerns about economic development shape
people's perceptions of the ruler and prevailing order, each ﬁgure
contains four images. Each image illustrates the effects of violent
events (horizontal axis) on the outcome (vertical axis) by level of
patron (dis)trust (lines in each panel), and the row of images show
how these associations vary across degrees of concern for new war
(values of 1, 2, 3, and 4) or economic development (values of 1, 2, 3,
and 4). The image on the far left shows what happens when re-
spondents have a very low concern, i.e. a score of 1, for either
economic development or new war, whereas the image on the far
right shows what happens when they are highly concerned about
either economic development or new war, i.e. a score of 4.Fig. 4. Conﬁdence in the prevailing order by patron (dis)trust,
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that patron distrust is, in general, associated with lower levels of
conﬁdence (the dotted line of predicted probabilities is consistently
below the solid line). The role of external forces is substantial and
inﬂuential. Beyond that, our extended analysis shows that the
severity of violence taking place at the local level is important for
people's conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order in a nuanced
and insightful manner. Whereas our ﬁndings above are based on
estimates that control for the possibility that violence in an area
could bias the estimated relationship, they tell us little about how
and why violent settings affect responses. In the study of violent
conﬂict, insights from political geography tells us that such dy-
namics should be modeled and interpreted explicitly, rather than
just operating as controls (Linke & O’Loughlin, 2015).
We elaborate ﬁrst on how conﬁdence in the prevailing order is
shaped by state-building concerns and patron (dis)trust across
varying levels of local violence. Fig. 4A, in which the images from
left to right show growing concerns about renewed war with the
parent state, illustrates the probabilities of reporting highstate-building concerns, and observed regional violence.
ilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
Fig. 5. Trust in the president by patron (dis)trust, state-building concerns, and observed regional violence.
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the results reported in Fig. 1A. For respondents who distrust the
patron, their conﬁdence is particularly low when they live in lo-
calities that have seen substantial amounts of violence during the
post-war period. The steeply declining dotted lines suggest that
people are less conﬁdent in places with more violent incidences. By
contrast, this impact of violent contexts ismitigated by patron trust,
as indicated by the solid lines. That is, the patron state's role as a
security guarantor mitigates also how internal violence shapes
people's conﬁdence about the prevailing order. An unexpected
result emerges in the upward slope of the line for patron trust when
violence becomes higher in an area (compared to the downward
slope of respondents who do not trust the patron). This demon-
strates that patron trust can mitigate the effect of internal security
concerns, but it is worthy of further investigation.
As expected (based on previous studies and our ﬁndings pre-
sented in Fig. 1A), respondents who trust the patron are also
affected by violence occurring in their area at variable levels
depending on their fear of renewed war with the parent state.
Comparing the probabilities of the patron trust line in the far right
hand panel, where fear of war is the highest (value of 4), to the far
left hand panel showing the trend for low fear (value of 1), we see
that the absolute values of the probabilities are smaller when
concern for war is higher.Please cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
Political Geography (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2017.06.011We see similar dynamics when looking at growing concerns
about economic development (Fig. 4B). Consistent with the analysis
so far, patron distrust is associated with lower conﬁdence in the
prevailing order. We also observe that as concerns for economic
development grow, people's conﬁdence in the prevailing order is
lower. Respondents who are the most likely to feel conﬁdent about
the prevailing order are thosewho trust the patron and do not think
that lack of economic development is a major problem (the far left
panel in Fig. 4B). That is consistent with conclusions drawn from
Fig. 1B. What these ﬁgures add to our understanding of how the
state's credibility is built and maintained is the importance of the
relative level of violence in the local context.
Unsurprisingly, if people do not trust the patron, an increasingly
violent context diminishes their conﬁdence in the prevailing order.
In the far left panel in Fig. 4B, we see that for people who are not
particularly concerned about lack of economic development and
who do trust the patron, a violent context is associated with a
higher chance that they feel conﬁdent about the prevailing order.
This ﬁnding seems counter-intuitive but, in this case, lack of con-
cerns about the economy and trust in the patron trump the impact
of the context of violence. In the far right panel of Fig. 4B, for people
who are greatly concerned about lack of economic development,
regardless of whether they trust the patron (but particularly when
they distrust the patron), a more violent context is associated withilding after war: External-internal relations in Eurasian de facto states,
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related to internal public goods provision nor trust in the external
patron can overcome the negative inﬂuence of living in a violent
context.
In Fig. 5, we turn to how levels of local violence shape the effect
that state-building concernsdabout renewed war (Fig. 5A) and
economic development (Fig. 5B)dand perceptions of the patron
have on people's trust in the president.
The ﬁndings in Fig. 5A are in line with our results in Fig. 2A, as
the height of the estimated curves (their position on the vertical
axis) for respondents who trust and also distrust the patron are
lowest in the far right panel, where concerns about war are the
greatest (value of 4). The ﬁgure reveals an unexpected dynamic,
although it leads to a conclusion that adds precision. Fig. 5A shows
that at lower levels of concern for a newwar, an increasingly violent
context is associated with increased trust in the president. In fact,
only when respondents are greatly concerned about a new war, as
indicated by the far right image, and distrust the patron do growing
levels of violence diminish trust in the president. That is, when
worries about external security, a violent local context, and patron
distrust all combine, the prospects for trust in the president are
very low.
Fig. 5B demonstrates how concerns for economic development
are shaped by patron trust and severity of local violence and tells a
largely similar story to our ﬁndings so far. Where the concern for
economic development is highest, as indicated by the far right
image, the overall level of trust in the president is lower (in the far
right image, the trend for those both with and without trust in the
patron are lower than in the far left image, where concerns about
economic development are low). In a relationship similar to what
we saw in Fig. 5A, there is evidence of a compound effect of patron
distrust, high levels of violence, and, in this case, concern for eco-
nomic development. Combined, these forces lead to the lowest
levels of predicted trust in the president. From the solid line in the
far right image, we also conclude that evenwhen people are greatly
concerned about lack of economic development, trust in the patron
can mitigate the negative effects of living in an especially violent
regional context.
4. Conclusion
The study demonstrates the nuances of complex and
theoretically-informed expectations of how conﬁdence in a ruler
and ruling orderdcredibilitydare generated and maintained,
focusing empirically on de facto territorial states born from violent
separatist conﬂicts. Although our empirical focus is on a particular
type of post-war society and institutional entity, de facto states, we
believe the ﬁndings relatemore generally to challenges facing post-
war scenarios. In former warzones that continue to experience
periodic violence, the threats of geopolitical instability or a new
conﬂict endure. There are good reasons to believe that inhabitants'
perceptions of both internal and external factors will shape their
conﬁdence of the (de facto) state's governing authorities and the
prevailing order. Our ﬁndings demonstrate that citizens' worries
about state-building and governing activities of the new territorial
entity reduce a ruler's credibility, but this is particularly the case
when citizens do not have much trust in the external patron
backing the ruler. Distrust of the external patron undermines the
credibility of the local authorities in providing security and condi-
tions of economic growth. That is, while post-war states may need
the security and ﬁnancial assistance offered by their patron
statesdand research has suggested that third parties can help
overcome the credible commitment problem facing post-war
statesdour analysis shows that patron states do not have a uni-
form positive effect upon the local population's perceptions ofPlease cite this article in press as: Bakke, K. M., et al., Dynamics of state-bu
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Rather than regarding the context of violence as simply a
background curtain to the stage of political dynamics, we explicitly
account for the contextual inﬂuences of continued violence in the
second step of our analysis. By modeling the relationship between
patron trust and conﬁdence in the territorial ruling order as it varies
by levels of local violence severity, we can estimate the relative
importance of a speciﬁc and important contextual factor that
shapes the rulers' credibility. Thus, we can conclude that the people
living in a poor economic environment express more conﬁdence in
their ruler and prevailing order even in a violent context because
the ruler is tied closely to a patron that can provide security and
economic aid. Such a conclusion indicates that citizens’ social
setting has strong impacts on governance support at sub-national
scalesdand, indeed, parallels research emphasizing the role of
contextual effects on, for example, voting (Agnew, 1987).
To the degree that conﬁdence in the ruler and prevailing order is
shaped by both internal and external dynamics, this has policy
implications for the local authorities and their patrons. If post-war
governments can provide public goods to their citizens and have a
patron perceived as trustworthy, they have a recipe for fostering
credible rule and stability within their (de facto) state. The role of
the patron state, however, is a potential vulnerability. Geopolitical
patrons like Russia will have their own interests and broader goals,
and the de facto states in the former Soviet space are likely to
continue to be places of contestation in a bigger geopolitical frame
between Russia and “theWest.” Aswe have shown in this study, the
patron cannot take the views of the de facto states' inhabitants for
granted, but having their trust is in the interest of the domestic
credibility of the de facto state's government.
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